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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1245 
_____________ 
  
KEITH BRUNSON, 
  Appellant 
  
v. 
  
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-00034) 
District Judge: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 15, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 31, 2017) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
Keith Brunson appeals from an order of the District Court adopting a Magistrate 
Judge’s recommendation to affirm the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.  We 
will affirm. 
I. 
 As we write for the benefit of the parties, we set out only the facts necessary for 
the discussion that follows.  In March 2006, Brunson injured his left shoulder while 
working as a trash collector.  He initially received physical therapy, but discontinued it in 
August 2006.  Brunson received no further formal treatment for almost two years.  After 
working on modified duty post-injury, Brunson ultimately stopped working and sought 
treatment with Dr. Brian J. Sennett.  Although Dr. Sennett recommended surgery, 
Brunson declined this option.  Several years later Brunson injured his right shoulder.  As 
before, he waited—this time for about six months—before he sought treatment.   
 In March 2012, Brunson applied for disability benefits.  Shortly thereafter, Dr. 
Harris Ross, the Social Security Administration’s evaluating physician, examined 
Brunson and completed a Medical Source Statement (“MSS”) regarding his abilities.  Dr. 
Ross concluded that Brunson was extremely limited in his ability to lift, stand, walk, and 
carry.  However, Dr. Ross left blank the areas of the form for “supportive medical 
findings,” only noting the date of the report.  R. 234–35.1  In Dr. Ross’s full summary, he 
stated that although Brunson complained of pain and had limited range of motion in both 
shoulders, his reflexes were intact and his grip was normal.   
                                              
1 The appellate record includes both an appendix prepared for this Court and a 
reproduced record from the District Court.  Following the convention of the parties, we 
cite to items in the initial appendix as “J.A.” and to those in the reproduced record as “R.” 
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Later, state agency medical consultant Dr. Sharon A. Wander reviewed Brunson’s 
medical records and arrived at a different conclusion.  In Dr. Wander’s detailed report, 
she concluded that Brunson was able to engage in light work, with fewer restrictions on 
lifting and sitting than Dr. Ross suggested.  After reviewing Dr. Ross’s records, she 
determined that Dr. Ross “impose[d] greater restrictions than the physical examination 
and medical evidence support[ed].”  J.A. 76.  She noted that Dr. Ross’s opinion “relie[d] 
heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and limitations provided by the individual,” 
and Dr. Wander regarded Brunson’s treatment decisions as contradicting his self-
reporting about limitations.  R. 78.  Following these evaluations, Brunson’s application 
was initially denied on June 8, 2012.   
 In August 2012, Brunson saw Dr. Sennett for his right shoulder injury.  He 
received physical therapy for a period of time, and ultimately underwent arthroscopic 
surgery on his right shoulder in January 2013.  After two post-operative appointments, 
Dr. Sennett indicated that Brunson was progressing well in his recovery, and 
recommended he begin physical therapy for his right shoulder.  Brunson abruptly stopped 
attending after only two sessions, and the therapy program subsequently discharged him 
for noncompliance.   
In June 2013, Dr. Sennett completed an MSS for each of Brunson’s injuries.  Dr. 
Sennett concluded that Brunson was extremely limited in lifting and carrying, and 
restricted in pushing, pulling, reaching, and his ability to hold certain postural positions.  
Where the forms asked Dr. Sennett to support his restrictions, he wrote only Brunson’s 
diagnoses.   
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In July 2013, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  At 
the hearing, both Brunson and a vocational expert testified.  Brunson reported that, 
despite his injuries, he continued to volunteer with his children’s track team, perform 
light housework, take his children to school, and attend church regularly.  Then, the 
vocational expert testified that a person with Brunson’s current level of function was 
capable of performing several light work positions—usher, school bus monitor, and 
children’s attendant—available in substantial numbers in the national economy.   
In August 2013, the ALJ issued her opinion.2  She found that, although Brunson 
suffered from severe impairments that precluded his ability to return to his previous 
work, he retained the ability to engage in other work in the national economy, making 
him not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act.  The Appeals Council denied 
review, making this a final decision of the Commissioner.  Brunson thereafter sought 
review in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where, after a Magistrate Judge 
recommended denying his request for review, the District Court affirmed.  This timely 
appeal followed. 
II.3 
                                              
2 In issuing her opinion, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential process set forth 
in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.  The process requires an ALJ to decide whether an applicant (1) 
is engaged in “substantial gainful activity;” (2) suffers from a “severe medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment;” (3) suffers from “an impairment(s) that 
meets or equals one” listed in the regulation’s appendix; (4) has a residual functional 
capacity (“RFC”) allowing for performance of “past relevant work;” and (5) can “make 
an adjustment to other work.”  Id. § 416.920(4)(i)–(v). 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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Although we exercise plenary review over an ALJ’s determination of legal 
principles, Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d 857, 858 (3d Cir. 1995), our review of the 
factual findings is for substantial evidence.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Chandler v. Comm’r of 
Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).  Substantial evidence is “such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 
U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  In determining whether 
substantial evidence exists, the reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for 
that of the ALJ.  Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).   
III. 
An individual who is disabled and meets income- and resource-based eligibility 
requirements is entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act.  42 U.S.C. § 1381a.  To 
establish disability, the individual must show that “there is some ‘medically determinable 
basis for an impairment that prevents him from engaging in any’ substantial gainful 
activity ‘for a . . . twelve-month period.’”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 
1999) (quoting Stunkard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 841 F.2d 57, 58 (3d Cir. 
1988)); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1).  The impairment must be such that the individual is “not 
only unable to do his previous work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of 
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”  42 U.S.C. § 
423(d)(2)(A).   
The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny 
Brunson’s request for review of the ALJ’s denial of his application for benefits because 
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the ALJ accepted Dr. Wander’s assessment of his physical capabilities and found that 
Brunson retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to engage in light work 
positions available in the national economy.  On appeal, Brunson argues that this 
determination was not supported by substantial evidence.  In particular, Brunson suggests 
that the ALJ inappropriately credited Dr. Wander’s assessment over those of Drs. Sennett 
and Ross—both because Dr. Sennett treated him while Dr. Wander merely reviewed his 
records, and because of Brunson’s view of their relative qualifications—and discounted 
his own testimony as to his pain and limitations.  Neither argument is availing.   
An ALJ may “weigh the [conflicting] medical evidence and draw [her] own 
inferences.”  Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196–97 (3d. Cir. 2011) (quoting Kertesz v. 
Crescent Hills Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986)).  Additionally, an ALJ may 
reject the opinion of a treating physician when it is unsupported and inconsistent with the 
other evidence in the record.  See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).4  Here, the ALJ rejected Dr. Sennett’s opinion in 
favor of Dr. Wander’s because of the other evidence in the record.  The ALJ noted that, 
although Dr. Sennett concluded Brunson was limited in his work abilities, his report 
lacked adequate support for this determination.  The ALJ also found Dr. Sennett’s 
conclusion conflicted with both Brunson’s self-reported daily activities and Dr. Sennett’s 
own positive reports after Brunson’s surgery.  As with Dr. Sennett, the ALJ found that 
                                              
4 The federal regulation addressing the weight of the treating source’s medical 
opinion is now codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), and it continues to provide that a 
treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight when it is “inconsistent with 
the other substantial evidence in” the case record. 
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Dr. Ross’s opinion was inconsistent with the record evidence.  As support, she cited Dr. 
Ross’s own findings that Brunson maintained normal grip strength and intact reflexes.  
Accordingly, the ALJ appropriately gave less weight to Drs. Ross and Sennett’s opinions 
in determining Brunson’s RFC.     
 As to Dr. Wander’s qualifications, although the relevant regulation does 
contemplate consideration of a physician’s specialty in determining the weight to accord 
to her opinion, specialty is just one factor to consider.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).  
Contrary to Brunson’s assertions, Dr. Wander—as a state agency medical consultant—
was per se qualified to issue a medical opinion for the ALJ’s consideration.  20 C.F.R. § 
404.1527(e)(2)(i).5  The ALJ relied upon the opinion of Dr. Wander because she regarded 
it—unlike the opinions of Drs. Ross and Sennett—as consistent with the medical 
evidence presented.  See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361–62 (affirming an ALJ decision 
relying upon a state agency medical consultant’s opinion in the presence of conflicting 
evidence). 
As to Brunson’s argument that the ALJ improperly discounted his testimony, the 
ALJ’s determination as to Brunson’s credibility and consistency is supported by 
substantial evidence.  See Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003).  In 
considering Brunson’s testimony as to his severe pain and physical limitations, the ALJ 
                                              
5 Similarly, this section has since been recodified without effecting our analysis.  
The section addressing evidence from Federal or State agency medical consultants now 
appears at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e), with a textual reference to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a.  
20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(b)(1) specifically provides that “Federal or State agency medical 
or psychological consultants are highly qualified and experts in Social Security disability 
evaluation.”  
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found his “credibility . . . to be undermined by his reliance on conservative treatment for 
his left shoulder, his post-surgical improvement of his right shoulder, a significant 
treatment gap, lack of consistent positive objective findings during the period at issue, 
and the presence of widely varied daily activities.”  R. 13–14.  This explanation presents 
substantial evidence to support the finding that Brunson’s testimony lacked credibility in 
light of the medical evidence.  See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429. 
Similarly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s ultimate determination that 
Brunson retained the RFC to engage in light work.  The ALJ pointed to the medical 
evidence and Brunson’s self-reported activities to demonstrate that he was capable of 
performing basic functions in his daily life comparable to those required by light work.  
See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 431–32.  Further, based on the vocational expert’s testimony, 
the ALJ reasonably concluded there were light work positions available to him in the 
national economy.   
IV. 
 Because the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm 
the order of the District Court. 
